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Abstract
Based on a systematic review and summarization of China’s 30 years of financial reform
and development, this paper comprehensively analyzes the past, present and future devel-
opment of China’s financial system and also presents the mechanism for China’s financial
development from the view of political economics. Generally, the Chinese financial system
is bank-oriented. The property rights structure, led by state-owned banks, is the prominent
feature of the Chinese banking system. Equity, bond, money, currency and real estate mar-
kets have been developing rapidly; however, the development rate of these markets varies,
and institutional construction generally falls behind the market development. China’s fi-
nancial decision-making authority belongs to the State Council, and the financial supervi-
sion system adopts the mode of “separate regulation.” China’s state-driven, progressive
financial reforms have promoted the formation of the government-led financial structure,
which is composed of three parts: first, monetary policy, balancing both inflation control
and economic growth; second, bank credit expansion under the implicit guarantee of the
state; and third, the adjustable pegged exchange rate system based on capital controls.
The next phase of financial reform in China will mainly focus on the following four key
goals: first, to further improve the corporate governance and the mixed operation of fi-
nancial institutions; second, to construct the institution of a financial market system and
improve the effectiveness of the financial markets; third, to re-integrate regulatory resources,
combine macro- and micro-prudent views, and establish a comprehensive framework for
financial stability; fourth, to promote the liberalization of interest rates, marketization of
the exchange rate and the opening of capital accounts based on a progressive approach
and to improve the openness of the financial system based on macroeconomic stability.
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■ 1. Introduction
Since the policies of reform and opening began in 1978, China’s economic development
has made remarkable achievements. During the past 30 years, the average GDP growth
rate reached nearly 10% per year. By the end of 2009, China’s total nominal GDP had
reached 4.91 trillion U.S. dollars, trailing only the U.S. and Japan and accounting for
8% of the total global economy. At the current rate of development, China’s total GDP
in 2010 is expected to reach 5.5 trillion U.S. dollars, which exceeds Japan’s 5.19 trillion
U.S. dollars in the same period. Hence, China will become the world’s second largest
economy. The sustained high growth of China’s economy since 1978 is known as the
“China miracle”. It has attracted the interest of a growing number of economists around
the world. Friedman once said, “The one who can explain China’s economic reform
and development will get the Nobel prize in Economics”.
With more and more discussions of the “China model” in economic development, 
financial reform and development issues in the Chinese economy have also attracted
much attention. Particularly against the backdrop of the global financial crisis,
China’s financial stability has again caught the world’s attention. Based on a system-
atic review and summarization of China’s 30 years of financial reform and develop-
ment, this paper comprehensively analyzes the past, present and future development
of China’s financial system and interprets China’s financial development from the
perspective of political economics. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes the general development environment in China’s financial system.
Section 3 analyzes China’s financial system from several aspects, such as history,
structure and market development. Section 4 briefly introduces China’s financial de-
cision making and supervision system. Section 5 summarizes China’s financial devel-
opment from a political economy perspective. Section 6 concludes.
■ 2. China’s Financial Development:  An Overview
2.1. High-speed Monetization Process
As a large open market country, China’s financial industry grows rapidly under
highly sustained economic growth. From the perspective of the degree of moneti-
zation, China’s broad money supply (M2) has continued to rise since the launch of
the “reform and opening” policy, from 107 billion RMB in 1978 to 60.6625 trillion
RMB at the end of 2009, a nearly 567-fold increase over three decades. At the same
time, China’s monetization rate (M2/GDP) has also risen, reaching 1.78 by the end
of 2009, the highest in the world (Figure 1). The phenomenon that monetization
continues to rise and remains at an unusually high level is known in economics as
“China’s high monetization mystery.”
A E S T I M AT I O
  
■ Figure 1. The Monetization Process in China: 1978-2009 
sources: china statistical Yearbook; PeoPle’s bank of china QuarterlY statistics; WinD info
■ Figure 2. Composition of China’s financial assets: 1990-2009
sources: china statistical Yearbook; PeoPle’s bank of china QuarterlY statistics; WinD info
The key to understanding China’s high monetization rate is to bridge China’s fi-
nancial development to the framework of China’s special social and economic back-
ground and structure of the bank-oriented financial system. On the one hand, with
the fast-growing economy and relatively narrow investment channels, Chinese res-
idents have few opportunities to invest. Furthermore, the social security system is
not well organized, and Chinese residents are “forced to save.” This in turn results
in a high M2/GDP rate because savings are all invested into the banking system.
On the other hand, for a long time, due to the “dual structure” of finance and econ-
omy and the unclear relationship among the government, financial sectors and fi-
nancial enterprises, a large share of savings are used to support the development
of an inefficient state-owned economy. This leads to a continued high monetization
rate and financial interrelations ratio (FIR), which are both driven by the increaseth
e 
c
hi
ne
se
 f
in
an
ci
al
 s
ys
te
m
 a
t 
th
e 
D
aw
n 
o
f 
th
e 
21
st
 c
en
tu
ry
: a
n 
o
ve
rv
ie
w
. Y
ul
u 
C
he
n,
 Y
on
g 
M
a 
an
d 
K
e 
Ta
ng
0 
0,2 
0,4 
0,6 
0,8 
1 
1,2 
1,4 
1,6 
1,8 
2 
0 
100000 
200000 
300000 
400000 
500000 
600000 
700000 
19
7
8
19
8
0
19
8
2
19
8
4
19
8
6
19
8
8
19
9
0
19
9
2
19
9
4
19
9
6
19
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
M2(GDP)M2(?100m)
0 
200000 
400000 
600000 
800000 
1000000 
1200000 
1400000 
1600000 Insurrance Co. Assets (?100m) Equity Market Value (?100m)  
Bond (?100m) Total Loans (?100m)
M2 (?100m)
19
9
0
19
9
1
19
9
2
19
9
3
19
9
4
19
9
6
19
9
5
19
9
8
19
9
7
19
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
A E S T I M AT I O4
of M2 and credits. Actually, Figure 2 also shows that the increase of China’s FIR is
mainly supported by increasing growth of M2 and loans; that is, China’s financial
growth is, in fact, caused by the state-owned enterprises borrowing from banks.
2.2 Rapid Expansion of Total Financial Assets
Together with rapid monetization, China’s total financial assets have also been rap-
idly growing. If we use the summation of M2, total bank loans and securities (in-
cluding the aggregate value of stocks, bonds and total insurance company assets)
as a substitute for total financial assets, China’s total financial assets grew from
290.6 billion to 150.250 trillion RMB from 1978 to 2009, a 508-fold increase. As
a representative indicator of financialization, China’s FIR has also increased in the
same period. The FIR was only 0.81 in 1978; it rose to 4.41 in 2009 (Figure 3).
■ Figure 3. China’s financial interrelations ratio (FIR): 1978-2009 
Note: According to different calculation of the financial assets, different studies have quite different results. In this paper, we use GDP
as a substitutive variable of general physical assets, and the sum of M2, total bank loans and securities as a substitute variable of
total financial assets. So in this paper, FIR= (M2+L+S)/GDP, where securities (S) include aggregate value of stocks, bonds and total
insurance companies assets.
sources：china statistical Yearbook; PeoPle’s bank of china QuarterlY statistics; WinD info
2.3 Diversified Structure of Financial Assets
Since the launch of the reform and opening policy, China’s financial assets have
developed from the single bank asset to diversified assets, with more and more fi-
nancial instruments appearing in China. For example, bonds, stocks, mutual funds
and insurance products have accounted for a large share of financial assets. With
access to the WTO, China will further expand its economic and financial opening
to the outside world. To meet the development needs of marketization and global-
ization, China’s financial reforms and innovations have accelerated noticeably, with
more new financial instruments, plentiful financial products, new investment chan-
nels and a variety of hedging instruments. Figure 4 shows that, from 1978 to 2008,
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after 30 years of development, China’s financial asset structure has shown a signif-
icant trend toward diversification, with abundant species and a balanced structure.
■ Figure 4. The change of China’s financial asset structure: 1978 vs. 2008
source: PeoPle’s bank of china
2.4 China’s Financial Development and Economic Growth: 
A Preliminary Assessment
Recent research has confirmed that financial development can improve economic
growth (Pagano, 1993; King and Levine, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1998；the
World Bank, 2001). Pagano (1993) concludes that financial development can in-
crease the ratio of savings to investment, improve the social marginal productivity
of capital, affect the private savings rate and thus influence economic development.
When considering the importance of finance to China’s economic growth, World
Bank reports (1996, 1997) indicate that increasing seigniorage along with moneti-
zation has reduced inflation pressure, achieved relative financial stability, main-
tained high subsidies from national savings to inefficient state-owned enterprises
and thus promoted an institutional transition and economic growth.
It is important to note that during China’s financial development, although the
M2/GDP rate rose for a long time, it did not cause serious inflation (Figure 5). McK-
innon (1993) first noticed the phenomenon that high M2/GDP and low inflation co-
existed in China and called it the “Chinese mystery.” Theorists have different
interpretations about this, but we believe that the root of the problem is China’s
unique financial structure and special financial systems during the transition. Under
the state-led economic model, the state provides an implicit guarantee of bank de-
posits and expands credit through national mobilization of savings. It provides a lot
A E S T I M AT I O
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of cheap credit and stimulates the expansion of domestic output and economic high-
speed growth. At the same time, capital controls and a pegged exchange rate system
constrain banks from credit expansion. The extra part of production capacity turns
into exports under the expectation of monetary expansionary, which relieves the hy-
perinflation problem caused by credit expansion. Of course, such special financial
arrangements also create negative effects. It is hard to avoid adverse selection and
moral hazard problems under the mode of policy-related loans, which makes China’s
financial system (especially the state-owned bank system) vulnerable to nonperform-
ing debt problems. A large amount of money residing in the financial system also sets
a dangerous precedent for a future assets bubble and long-term inflation.
■ Figure 5. China’s high monetization rate co-existed with low inflation rate
source:  WinD info
■ 3. The Chinese Financial System: 
History, Structure and Market Development
3.1 Process of Financial System Reform
This section will review the development of the Chinese financial market. Before
1978, China was a typical economy based on public financing with no modern fi-
nancial system or services. The Chinese financial system was initially built in 1984,
when the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) was broken into four specialized banks:
the Bank of China (BOC), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC),
the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and the Construction Bank of China (CBC).
At that time, there was a two-tiered bank system: the first tier is the PBOC, working
as a central bank; and the other tier was formed by four specialized banks. Since
the 1990s, the original two-tiered financial system has developed further with re-
A E S T I M AT I O
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spect to several aspects: since 2003, the central bank has no longer been involved
in banking supervision, new banks and non-bank financial institutions have
emerged, and the Chinese stock market has developed gradually.
Development of the Chinese financial system can be divided into five periods: the
initial stage (1978-1983), development stage (1984-1993), acceleration stage
(1994-1997), adjustment stage (1998-2001) and new reform stage (2002- now).
Table 1 shows the background, reform policy and major events for each stage of
financial system reform.
From the history of Chinese financial system reform, it is not difficult to observe
that every reform in every stage aimed to solve the problems that were being en-
countered at that time. In China, the development of a market economy demands
reform in the financial system, and financial system reform in turn promotes the
development of a market economy. After over 30 years of reform, China has initially
established a financial system structure that matches the development of the mar-
ket economy and has also made great progress in financial institutions, markets,
products and the diversification of the financing structure and in the specialization
of the financial macrocontrol and supervision system (Figure 6).
● Table 1. Different stages in the Chinese financial system reform
StageStage Main policy Major events
First stage
(1978-1983) 
➢ Starting stage
➢ Reform the
‘unification’ financial 
system
➢ The financial system reform started after
the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh
Central Committee in 1978
➢ A series of reform has taken place in finan-
cial field, especially for the financial institu-
tions.
➢ PBOC focused on its national central
bank function.
➢ Four national specialized bank took
over PBOC’s regular commercial oper-
ation function and the two-layered
bank system was established.
➢ State Administration of Foreign Ex-
change (SAFE) was established to
manage the foreign exchange.
Second stage (1978-1993)  
Development stage
➢ Financial market 
not founded
➢ Begun to establish pilot projects for financial
system reform.
➢ Direct credit management became one tool
of central bank’s monetary policy.
➢ Commercial shareholding banks was per-
mitted.
➢ Rural and urban credit cooperatives
developed dramatically.
➢ Inter-lending market, bill market and
foreign exchange market were initially
established.
➢ Shanghai and Shenzhen stock ex-
change were established.
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Third stage 
(1994-1997)  
➢ Acceleration stage
➢ Financial system 
reform in progress
➢ “Decision on reform of financial system” and “No-
tice on further reform of foreign exchange man-
agement system” were enacted.
➢ Law of the People’s Bank of China, Law of Com-
mercial Bank, Law of Insurance, Law of Bill and
Assurance Law were enacted gradually.
➢ Provisional measures for the Portfolio Investment
Funds, Company Law and Stock Act were enacted
gradually.
➢ Open market operation became the major control
method for the central bank.
➢ Unification of exchange rate
➢ Three policy banks, i.e. CDB, ADBC and
EXIM bank, were established.
➢ Four national specialized banks
changed to national commercial banks.
➢ The first private commercial bank, i.e.
Minsheng Bank, was established.
➢ Inter-bank bond market was built na-
tionally.
➢ Monetary policy committee was estab-
lished.
➢Free convertibility of the RMB under the
current account was realized.
Forth stage 
(1998-2001)
➢ Adjustment stage
➢ 1997 Asian financial 
crisis
➢ The first central financial conference on Novem-
ber, 1997 promoted the reform of financial super-
vision system.
➢ The restructuring of various organizations under
the State Council began.
➢ The central bank has separated its bank supervi-
sion function since 2003 and the segregated su-
pervision system of “one bank, three
commissions” was built.
➢ Four asset management corporations,
i.e. Xinda, Huangrong, Great Wall and
Orient, were established to strip off
1400 billion Yuan bad assets of four
commercial banks and China Develop-
ment Bank.
➢ CSRC, CIRC and CBSC were estab-
lished.
Fifth stage 
(2002-now) 
➢ New reform stage
➢ China accessed WTO
in late 2001
➢ The second Central 
Financial Conference 
in Feb, 2002
➢ Established five-category credit and accounting
rules.
➢ Established information disclosure rules.
➢ Started experimental reform of rural credit coop-
eratives.
➢ Carried out shareholding reform for national com-
mercial banks.
➢ Established experimental reform for share-spilt.
➢ Advanced interest rates marketization reform.
➢ Set the exchange rate on a basket of world curren-
cies.
➢ Financial industry was totally opened after the
WTO transitional period on November, 2006.
➢ The third central financial conference on January,
2007 promoted the development of rural financial
system reform and construction of multi-layered
capital market system.
➢ Permitted foreign banks to engage in RMB busi-
ness.
➢ Permitted various types of QDII and QFII to en-
gage in stock trading respectively.
➢ Four national commercial banks except
ABC have finished stockholding system
reform and were listed for trading in
stock exchanges.
➢ Small and medium-sized enterprises
board and growth enterprise market
were opened.
➢ Non-tradable share reform for national
listed companies has completed.
➢ Established corporate bond market.
➢ Established futures market and en-
riched derivative products
➢ Established SHIBOR rates.
➢ China Investment Corporation was es-
tablished to invest financial assets
abroad using foreign reserves.
➢ Foreign banks branched out to the rural
region.
➢ Small loan companies emerged.
➢ Institutional investors including private-
equity funds grew stronger.
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■Figure 6. The basic structure of Chinese financial system
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3.2 Overall Structure of the Chinese Financial Industry
The Chinese financial structure is typically bank dominated. From 1990 to 2007, the aver-
age ratio of deposit bank assets to stock market capitalization was 3.07, even higher than
that of Germany, a typical bank-dominated country (Figure 7). Additionally, long-term
bank loans account for about 80% of total financing during 1990 to 2007 (Table 2).
■ Figure 7. The Chinese financial system with comparison to other major countries
Note:  The financial system structure is represented by the ratio of Deposit Money Bank Assets to the Stock Market Capitalization and
the data is the average value between 1990 and 2007.
Data resource: financial structure Dataset（WorlD bank，2008）
● Table 2. China’s financial structure from 1997 to 2008 
(unit: 100 million RMB, %)
Year Total Bank Proportion Treasury Proportion Corporate Proportion Stock Proportion
financing loans bond bonds
1997 14174 11339 80.00 1865 13.16 35 0.25 934 6.59
1998 14909 11846 79.46 2218 14.88 42 0.28 804 5.39
1999 14562 10721 73.62 2776 19.06 167 1.15 897 6.16
2000 17163 12499 72.83 2478 14.44 83 0.48 2103 12.25
2001 16555 12558 75.86 2589 15.64 147 0.89 1252 7.56
2002 24233 19228 79.35 3718 15.34 325 1.34 962 3.97
2003 35154 29936 85.16 3525 10.03 336 0.96 1357 3.86
2004 29023 24066 82.92 3126 10.77 327 1.13 1504 5.18
2005 31507 24617 78.13 2996 9.51 2010 6.38 1884 5.98
2006 39874 32687 81.98 2675 6.71 2266 5.68 2246 5.63
2007 49817 39205 78.70 1790 3.59 2290 4.60 6532 13.11
2008 60486 49854 82.42 1027 1.70 6078 10.05 3527 5.83
2009 130747 105225 80.48 8182 6.26 12320 9.42 5020 3.84
Note:  Public offering of financial institutions is not included in stock financing.  Corporate bonds include entrepreneur bonds, short-
term corporate bonds, medium-term note, collective debt, detachable bonds and corporate debts.
Data resources: rePort on chinese financial market DeveloPment, 2009
A
u
s
tr
a
li
a
 
B
ra
zi
l 
C
a
n
a
d
a
 
C
h
in
a
 
G
e
rm
a
n
y 
F
ra
n
c
e
 
U
n
it
e
d
 K
in
g
d
o
m
 
I
n
d
ia
 
J
a
p
a
n
 
K
o
re
a
, R
e
p
. 
U
n
it
e
d
 S
ta
te
s
 
1,17  
2,44  
1,12  
3,07  
2,59  
1,62  
0,75  
2,17  
1,20  
2,06  
0,81  
0,00  
0,50  
1,00  
1,50  
2,00  
2,50  
3,00  
3,50  
11
t
he c
hinese financial system
 at the D
aw
n o
f the 21st c
entury: a
n o
verview
. Yulu C
hen, Yong M
a and K
e Tang
As the Chinese economy continues to climb, the development of the stock market
accelerates. Overall, however, the stock market cannot efficiently replace the fi-
nancing function of large banks. From 1993 to 2009, the average amount of do-
mestic stock market financing only accounted for 6.42% of bank loans and merely
23.21% even during the bull stock market of 2007. Additionally, equity financing
is unstable compared with bank loans, that is, the financing amount available in
different years fluctuates with the stock market cycle (Table 3).
● Table 3. Comparison of Chinese stock financing and bank loans 
(100 million RMB) 
Year Stock financing in Domestic market Bank loans Ratio（%）
1993 314.54 6335.40 4.96
1994 138.05 7216.62 1.91
1995 118.86 9339.82 1.27
1996 341.52 10683.33 3.20
1997 933.82 10712.47 8.72
1998 803.57 11490.94 6.99
1999 897.39 10864.36 8.27
2000 1541.02 13346.61 11.55
2001 1182.13 12439.41 9.50
2002 779.75 18979.20 4.11
2003 823.10 27702.30 2.97
2004 862.67 19201.60 4.49
2005 338.13 16492.60 2.05
2006 1231.89 31441.30 3.92
2007 8431.86 36322.51 23.21
2008 3308.16 41703.76 7.93
2009 3923.51 96290.18 4.07
Note: National stock financing is the sum of A share and B share financing.
Data resource: Pboc, csrc
The bank-dominated characteristic of the system can also be found from the com-
parison of bank, securities and insurance industry data. First, among the securities
issued from 1998 to 2008, in total, 8440 billion RMB treasury bonds, 5490 billion
RMB of policy-oriented financial bonds, 700 billion RMB of corporate debt and
2020 billion RMB of stock financing were issued. All of them only amount to
69.39% of the 24000 billion bank loans. Bank assets totaled 62,400 billion RMB
in 2008 and 78,800 billion RMB in 2009, while insurance assets were valued at
3,300 billion in 2008 and 4,100 billion in 2009, which only accounted for about
5% of bank assets.
A E S T I M AT I O12
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3.3 Chinese Financial Institutions and Financial Market Development
A. Banks 
The banking industry in China has the dominant position in the financial system,
and the situation will hold for a long time; this makes the bank-dominant financial
system more endogenous and path dependent. From the internal structure, four
nationally owned commercial banks dominate the banking system, and it will en-
dure for a long time. The shareholding commercial banks have recently been in a
steady state of development; city commercial banks have grown rapidly in numbers
since 1996, after the acceleration of Chinese banking reform. Moreover, a variety
of reform processes continue in other financial institutions, including policy-related
banks, rural commercial banks, rural cooperative banks, urban credit cooperative,
rural credit cooperative, enterprise group finance companies, trust and investment
corporation, financial leasing companies and postal savings banks.
The national banks’ dominance is obvious from the ownership distribution of the
Chinese banking industry. At the end of 2009, the total assets of different financial
institutions totaled 78,800 billion RMB, among which national commercial banks
owned 40,100 billion, accounting for 50.89%, shareholding commercial banks had
11,800 billion, accounting for 14.97%, city commercial banks had 5,700 billion,
accounting for 7.23%, and other institutions had 21,200 billion, accounting for
26.90%. (See Figure 8 for details.) Therefore, national commercial banks account
for nearly half of the total bank assets. State-owned property is more obvious if
taking into account the state-owned portion of shareholding commercial banks,
city commercial banks and other financial institutions
■ Figure 8. Assets for different financial institutions (1 trillion RMB)
Data source: cbrc
An ownership structure dominated by national banks is the pronounced feature of
the Chinese banking system, which is deeply rooted in the special political, economic
and cultural foundation of China and also determines other characteristics in China’s
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financial industry. On the one hand, the state-owned structure guarantees that the
government can employ a great amount of financial resources and plays an important
role in maintaining the “national credit” and its financial control power. On the other
hand, related soft-budget constraints and principal-agent problems threaten the de-
velopment of Chinese commercial banks. Therefore, the difficulties for further reform
include official dominance of banking operation, high transaction costs, high agency
costs and the usual expectation of “state takes final risks” in the financial industry.
Recently, before the end of the WTO transition period, having benefited from policy
reforms, market liberalization and sustained economic growth, China finished a major
split-off of bad loans and a provision of capital for major commercial banks, recon-
structed banks’ capital and created favorable conditions for subsequent shareholder
reforms and public listings. After an arduous restructuring and transformation of op-
erational mechanisms, the development of Chinese banking has achieved remarkable
results, for example, the non-performing loan ratio declined for seven consecutive
years, corporate governance continued to improve, internal control and risk manage-
ment systems have strengthened and anti-risk and sustainable development capabil-
ities have been greatly enhanced.
According to statistics from CBRC, at the end of 2009, domestic and foreign assets
of Chinese banks totaled 78,800 billion RMB, more than 400 times the value in 1978;
assets of banks with adequate capital account for 99.9% of total bank assets; the
capital return was 16.24%; the non-performing loan ratio of major commercial banks
declined to 1.59%; provision coverage reached 155.02% (Figure 9). The market value
of ICBC, CCB and BOC were 269 billion, 2015 billion and 154 billion US dollars,
ranking first, second and fifth globally, respectively in terms of market capitalization.
■ Figure 9. Total bad loans and bad loan ratio for Chinese 
major commercial banks
Data resource: cbrc Website
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From an international comparison, the operational efficiency of the Chinese bank
sector has significantly improved: not only is the profitability (such as ROA, ROE)
close to European and American levels but also operating efficiency (denominated
by operating cost) has been greatly improved. Overhead costs, net interest margins
and the cost-income ratio are also at a lower level (Table 4).
● Table 4. The operational capability of Chinese banking sector 
with comparison to other major countries
Countries Bank Overhead Net Interest Bank ROA Bank ROE Bank Cost-
Costs / Total Assets Margin Income Ratio
China 0.0128 0.0225 0.0098 0.1349 0.4885
America 0.0355 0.0417 0.0119 0.1365 0.6725
Canada 0.0306 0.0229 0.0056 0.0431 0.6974
Great Britain 0.0300 0.0243 0.0126 0.1031 0.6468
Germany 0.0372 0.0281 0.0054 0.0556 0.7500
France 0.0330 0.0303 0.0051 0.0502 0.7388
Japan 0.0166 0.0178 -0.0006 -0.0007 0.7087
India 0.0248 0.0334 0.0070 0.1297 0.5888
Korea 0.0216 0.0264 0.0015 -0.0573 0.7101
Australia 0.0362 0.0197 0.0053 0.0597 0.6663
Brazil 0.0856 0.1314 0.0216 0.1218 0.7643
Data resource: calculateD from the Data of financial structure Dataset (WorlD bank, 2008）
According to the British Bankers magazine, in 2010, China has 84 banks ranked among
the top 1000 banks in the world, of which the total assets account for 9% of the 1000
banks’ assets, and pre-tax profit accounts for 25%. The ICBC ranked 7th and was the
most profitable bank in the world. Therefore, from the standpoint of capital, the ratio
of bad loans and profitability, China’s banking system has been formed stable, and the
current China’s banking sector is in the best period of its history.
Note that the achievements that Chinese banks (especially those large national
banks) have made recently are because of “extensive development,” with the strong
support of the government. It could not have occurred without asset injection and
a split-off of bad assets. Moreover, although the operating efficiency indicators of
the Chinese banking sector are near the levels of developed countries in numbers,
they were made in an environment of a relatively closed market, a low level of com-
petition and large deposit-loan spread (Figure 10). Compared with world-class fi-
nancial institutions, the internal development of the Chinese banking sector is
insufficient; also, international competitiveness is still weak. This is reflected mainly
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in the following four areas: first, banks still have considerable shortcomings in cor-
porate governance; second, an internationally competitive business model has not
formed; third, risk control is still at a low level; fourth, innovation and innovative
capabilities are relatively less developed.
■ Figure 10. Chinese deposit and loan rates and their spreads: 1982-2009
Data resource: cbrc Website
B. Stock market
With the completion of non-tradable share reform and several IPOs of some large
enterprises in recent years, the scale and capacity of the stock market has greatly
increased, and the structure of investors has become more diversified in China.
Particularly after the launch of growth enterprises market, China’s stock market
has formed a multi-layered market system, including a main board, a small- and
medium-enterprise board, a growth enterprise market and an agency-share transfer
system. At the end of 2009, there were 1718 listed companies, 215 more listed
companies than in 1990; the market capitalization of listed companies has reached
29.08 trillion RMB, 86.70% of GDP. Since 2006, the IPO capital that mainland
China and Hong Kong have raised has become the world’s largest. In 2009, with
the Shanghai Composite Index climbing to 3277.14 points at the end of year from
1820.81 points at the beginning of the year, the total market value of Shanghai
and Shenzhen rose from 12.13 trillion to 24.27 trillion RMB, which made it the
world’s second largest market, following only the USA (Figure 11).
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■ Figure 11. Chinese stock market value and A share index: 1990-2010 
major commercial banks
● Table 5. The development of Chinese stock market
Year Total number Total shares Capital stock Total market A share market Average Average
of listed (100 million) in circulation in  value value in circulation P/E ratio P/B ratio
companies (100 million) (100 million RMB) (100 million)
1990 8 0.97 0.47 23.82 9.82 442.61 15.26 
1995 323 851.35 301.28 3939.28 797.47 19.69 2.02 
2000 1088 3801.60 1365.04 50744.88 15610.91 61.99 5.04 
2001 1160 5220.10 1818.89 46326.47 13399.66 61.20 3.58 
2002 1224 5877.35 2041.53 40964.56 11755.03 44.29 2.81 
2003 1287 6436.71 2280.91 45645.09 12351.06 33.36 2.69 
2004 1377 7163.47 2591.90 39896.68 11015.47 21.55 2.09 
2005 1381 7638.81 2924.03 34952.50 10045.82 20.12 1.70 
2006 1434 14847.46 5562.09 103524.92 23697.27 27.33 3.03 
2007 1550 22312.16 10181.37 401287.71 90724.43 40.22 6.31 
2008 1625 24378.22 12373.12 148383.09 44549.24 16.95 2.09 
2009 1718 26212.33 19721.67 290785.93 149615.16 25.57 3.41 
Date resource: WinD
Corresponding to the growth of the stock market, the structure of market investors has
also significantly changed. In the past ten years, the number of Chinese institutional in-
vestors has greatly increased. The money raised by public funds reached hundreds of
billions, and private equity funds developed fast. With the continuous heat of the A-
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share market since 2006, more and more small and medium investors have participated
in the market; as of April 2010, the number of stock investors had reached 150 million,
and the number of mutual fund investors had reached 30 million.
It can be concluded that after more than ten years of development, the Chinese stock
market has made a great achievement in both scale and capacity, but there is still a
great gap compared with well-developed foreign stock markets. From comparative
international data of the World Bank in 2008, from 1990 to 2007, Chinese market
capitalization and total value traded over GDP were close to that of India and Brazil
but significantly lower than the major developed countries, such as the US, Japan and
Canada. Moreover, the Chinese stock market is unstable in that the stock average
turnover ratio is far higher than for major developed countries (Figure 12).
■ Figure 12. Chinese stock market and comparison of major countries
Note: Data is averaged value between 1990 and 2007.
Data resource: financial structure Dataset (WorlD bank, 2008）
Note that a great achievement has been made in the “quantity” of stock market
development but relatively less achievement has been made in “quality.” Some chal-
lenges still exist in the market structure and efficiency, corporate governance and
supervision efficiency, the stock exchange’s competitive advantage and infrastruc-
ture, and in comprehensive legislation and enforcement. In particular, problems
mainly exist for corporate governance and market stability, such as the strong spec-
ulative atmosphere and high stock volatility. This may affect the effectiveness of re-
source allocation in the stock market.
A E S T I M AT I O
0,00  
0,50  
1,00  
1,50  
2,00  
2,50  
0,00  
0,20  
0,40  
0,60  
0,80  
1,00  
1,20  
1,40  
1,60  
A
u
s
tr
a
li
a
 
B
ra
zi
l 
C
a
n
a
d
a
 
C
h
in
a
 
G
e
rm
a
n
y 
F
ra
n
c
e
 
U
n
it
e
d
 K
in
g
d
o
m
 
I
n
d
ia
 
J
a
p
a
n
 
K
o
re
a
, R
e
p
. 
U
n
it
e
d
 S
ta
te
s
 
Stock Market Capitalization/GDP?left axis? 
Stock Market Total Value Traded/GDP?left axis? 
Stock Market Turnover Ratio?right axis?  
18
t
he
 c
hi
ne
se
 f
in
an
ci
al
 s
ys
te
m
 a
t 
th
e 
D
aw
n 
o
f 
th
e 
21
st
 c
en
tu
ry
: a
n 
o
ve
rv
ie
w
. Y
ul
u 
C
he
n,
 Y
on
g 
M
a 
an
d 
K
e 
Ta
ng
Because of instability, the Chinese stock market has significant volatility. For the
ratio of market value to GDP, there were two peaks, in 2000 and 2007, and three
troughs, in 1995, 2005 and 2008 (Figure 13).
In fact, many empirical studies have demonstrated that the Chinese stock market has
not reached a state of weak efficiency (refer to Yu 1995, Wu 1996 and Hu etc. 2002.)
Although the number of Chinese institutional investors has significantly increased,
corporate governance has not been significantly improved. For many funds, oppor-
tunism and speculation have replaced value investment, which obviously only reflects
short-term vision. Moreover, the Chinese stock market is known as a policy market,
in which investor behavior is largely affected by government policy, which causes a
policy-dependent bias. The policy-dependent bias, along with investor-behavior biases
such as loss aversion, overconfidence and excess fear, are likely to cause the market
to overreact.
■ Figure 13. The ratio of Chinese stock market over GDP: 1990-2009
Data resource: china financial Yearbook in everY Year
C. Bond Market
The scale of the Chinese bond market has rapidly increased, from 840.4 billion in
1998 to 8.930 trillion RMB in 2009, a 10.63 times growth in 11 years (Figure 14).
In terms of the issuing structure, government or government-related bonds (such
as central bank bills or policy-oriented financial debt) nearly dominated the bond
market. Although the scale of corporate bonds continuously grew, from 7.3 billion
in 1999 to 1.120 trillion RMB in 2009, it only accounted for a small portion of the
total bond market.
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■ Figure 14. The Structure of Chinese Bond Market: 1998-2009
Data sources: rePort on china’s financial market DeveloPment, 2009
From 1998 to 2009, the cumulative issuing amount in the bond market was 43.732 tril-
lion RMB. Among the bond market, the national debt issued totaled 10.54 trillion RMB,
accounting for 24.09% of the total issuing value; policy-banking debt issued totaled 6.85
trillion RMB, accounting for 15.66%; central bank bills issued totaled 21.41 trillion RMB,
accounting for 48.95%; non-policy financial debt issued totaled 760.8 billion RMB, ac-
counting for 1.74%; commercial papers issued totaled 1.67 trillion RMB, accounting for
3.81%; asset-backed securities issued totaled 63.8 billion RMB, accounting for 0.32%;
enterprise bonds issued totaled 138 billion RMB, accounting for 4.55%; corporate bonds
issued totaled 120.1 billion RMB, accounting for 0.27%; convertible bonds issued totaled
138.3 billion RMB, accounting for 0.32%; local treasury debt started to issue in 2009,
and the total issuing size was 200 billion RMB, accounting for 0.46% (Figure 15).
■ Figure 15. Cumulative issuing scale of Chinese Bond Market: 1998-2009
Data sources: rePort on china’s financial market DeveloPment, 2009
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In terms of bond market transactions (Table 6), from 1997 to 2009, the spot trad-
ing volume of the interbank bond market increased from 0.89 billion to 48.87 tril-
lion RMB, and the repurchase transaction volume increased from 356 billion to
70.29 trillion RMB. In the exchange-traded bond market, the treasury spot trading
volume increased from 356.1 billion in 1997 to 870.8 billion in 2002, and then it
declined to 208.5 billion RMB in 2009. The treasury repurchase transaction volume
differed across various years: the lowest number was 1.28 trillion in 1997, and the
highest number was 5.30 trillion in 2003. It was 3.55 trillion in 2009. The trading
volume of the over-the-counter (OTC) market increased from 1.44 billion in 2002
to 6.28 billion RMB in 2009.
As of 2009, the top three categories of bonds ranked by trading volume were policy-
oriented financial debt, central bank debt and medium-term notes, accounting for
36.41%, 29.80% and 13.43% of the total volume, respectively. In terms of turnover
rate, the most liquidity security is in medium-term notes, with a turnover rate of 761%;
it is followed by commercial paper, policy-oriented financial debt and central bank
bills, with turnover rates of 616%, 400% and 344%, respectively.
● Table 6. Trading Volume in Bond Market, 1997-2009 
(Unit: 100 million RMB, %)
Year Interbank bond market Exchange bond market OTC
Spot YoY Repurchase YoY Spot YoY Repurchase YoY
trading trading trading trading 
Volume Volume volume Volume
1997 8.90 —— 309.87 —— 3561.66 —— 12876.77 —— 0
1998 76.39 758.52 1021.48 229.65 6059.90 70.10 15540.86 20.69 0
1999 150.50 97.03 3956.93 287.37 5300.90 -12.50 12890.44 -17.05 0
2000 647.66 330.33 15784.94 298.92 4157.50 -21.60 14733.66 14.30 0
2001 844.34 30.37 40133.30 154.25 4815.60 15.80 15487.63 5.12 0
2002 4343.50 414.43 101885.21 153.87 8708.69 80.80 24419.66 57.67 14.40
2003 31609.70 627.75 117203.41 15.03 5756.16 -33.90 52999.86 117.04 24.50
2004 28196.45 -10.80 94367.54 -19.48 2966.50 -48.50 44086.63 -16.82 62.20
2005 63378.92 124.78 159007.15 68.5 2779.05 -6.30 23261.20 -46.42 65.70
2006 109326.62 72.50 265912.71 67.23 1540.70 -44.60 15413.30 -34.75 42.80
2007 165915.94 51.76 447924.95 68.45 1267.32 -17.70 18345.09 19.02 35.70
2008 408269.74 146.07 581205.24 29.76 2122.51 67.50 24268.66 32.29 30.40
2009 488682.15 19.70 702898.60 20.94 2085.11 -1.76 35475.87 46.18 62.80
Data sources: rePort on china’s financial market DeveloPment, 2009
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With the rapid development of bond markets, the number of market participants has
increased from 315 in 2000 to 9,247 in 2009, a nearly 30-fold increase in 10 years (Table
7). With the increasing participation of mutual funds and other enterprises, the bond
market has gradually developed into a diversified market with various agencies.
● Table 7. Number of participants in the interbank bond market, 
2000-2009
Year Bank Securities Mutual Insurance Nonbank Credit Other Enterprise Total
Firm Fund Company financial union
institutions
2000 159 2 32 11 7 102 2 0 315
2001 156 2 41 11 15 254 2 1 482
2002 182 25 78 20 52 423 2 32 814
2003 198 87 192 38 97 575 3 1889 3079
2004 231 95 361 63 117 665 11 2755 4298
2005 271 103 500 91 121 680 13 3729 5508
2006 295 107 613 104 136 711 23 4450 6439
2007 308 112 688 113 142 762 30 4940 7095
2008 341 117 1053 128 154 801 24 5681 8299
2009 391 123 1589 131 164 843 16 5990 9247
Data sources: rePort on china’s financial market DeveloPment, 2009
The Chinese bond market is still in an immature stage: its size is much smaller than
that of the US, France, Germany, Japan, Canada and other developed countries; it
is also smaller than South Korea, Brazil and other emerging markets (Figure 16).
In addition, the structure of products in the Chinese bond market is still immature;
particularly, the corporate bond market is largely lagging behind. Only a few bonds,
such as commercial paper, convertible corporate bonds, equity warrant bonds and
listed corporate bonds are “true” corporate bonds, whose proportions are still
much lower than those in mature markets. Moreover, many issues, such as market
segmentation, the underdevelopment of intermediaries, and the homogeneity of
investors, have limited the bond market from discovering the market price and pro-
moting financial efficiency.
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■ Figure 16. Comparison between Chinese Bond Market and Other Countries
Data source: financial structure Dataset (WorlD bank, 2008)
D. Money Markets
Not until the early 1980s did the Chinese money market begin to develop. After
1998, it gradually got on the right track. After 20 years of development, the Chinese
money market has developed a market system that includes the interbank lending
market, interbank bond market, and bill market. The interbank lending market has
become the main place for the position management of financial institutions; the
interbank bond market has become the main platform for the central bank’s open
market operation; and the bill market has become an important channel for short-
term financing and the bank’s liquidity management.
In terms of the trading categories, the Chinese money market mainly contains the in-
terbank lending market, bond repurchasing market and bill market. From 1997 to
2009, the cumulative trading volume of the interbank lending market has increased
from 829.8 billion to 19.35 trillion RMB; the trading volume of the pledged-style repo
market has increased from 31 billion to 67.7 trillion RMB; the trading volume of the
outright repo market has increased from 126.3 billion to 2.59 trillion RMB (Figure
17). In the bill market, the open interest of commercial paper has grown from 69.5
billion RMB in 1995 to 4.1 trillion RMB in 2009; the value of discounted bills has in-
creased from 54.7 billion to 2.4 trillion RMB, accordingly.
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■ Figure 17. Trading Volume of interbank lending and bond 
repurchasing markets, 1997-2009 (Unit: 100 million RMB)
Data source: china foreign exchange traDe sYstem
In terms of market participants, the Chinese money market is divided into the in-
terbank market and exchange market. The interbank market dominates the money
market. This market has two significant features: first, banks (especially state-
owned banks) and banking institutions (primarily credit unions) are the main play-
ers, and non-banking financial institutions only account for a small share; second,
state-owned banks have the monopoly on providing money, and capital moves one-
way, from banks (especially the four major state-owned banks) to other institu-
tions. In contrast, non-banking financial institutions, particularly securities firms
and mutual funds, dominate the exchange market. Because arbitrage activities be-
tween the two markets commonly exist, some features from interbank markets are
also reflected in the exchange market. Also, the weak non-banking financial insti-
tutions often meet their financial needs by using interbank markets. However, due
to different trading patterns and settlement systems between the two markets and
the close relationship between the exchange and stock markets, the interest rate in
the exchange market is more sensitive and volatile than the interbank market.
The Chinese interbank market has significant seasonal characteristics. Historical data
show that the interest rate in the Chinese money market is mainly influenced by macro-
economic trends (mainly inflation and the market expectation of inflation), monetary
policy adjustments (mainly the benchmark interest rate and deposit reserve rate) and
open market operations. Furthermore, in contrast to developed markets, an important
feature of the Chinese money market is the interest rate jumps caused by arbitrage ac-
tivities. In recent years, because of the intensive IPOs of new stock and their mispricing,
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arbitragers often raise funds from the short-term money market to purchase new stocks,
resulting in violent fluctuations in the money market rate.
Compared with the developed market, the Chinese money market has many problems,
such as small trading volume, lack of diversity in financial products and an imperfect
risk management system. The transactions in primary and secondary markets are only
made by a few players, and thus the market rates lack elasticity; moreover, they are cou-
pled with high information and risk costs and, hence, not efficient.
In terms of the interest rate discovery mechanism, SHIBOR still has some serious
flaws as an indicator of monetary policy, and the money market thus lacks a stable
long-term interest rate indicator. Moreover, in terms of market structure, due to
the monopoly power of state-owned banks, each adjustment of the reserve rate
causes an adjustment to the interbank market rate, accordingly. It makes the foun-
dation of the market rate very fragile because state-owned banks have a significant
impact on interest rates.
E. Foreign Exchange Market
Before the launch of the reform and opening policy, due to the shortage of foreign
exchange, China implemented a stringent exchange control policy. After the reform
of the foreign exchange system in 1994, China established a unified and standard
interbank foreign exchange market. PBOC adjusted the RMB exchange rate by trad-
ing on the foreign market. In December 1996, China achieved convertibility for
RMB’s current account. Subsequently, China treated and managed international
capital flows separately and promoted the convertibility of the RMB capital ac-
count step-by-step. In 2005, China implemented a series of reforms for RMB ex-
change rates, including the following: the relaxation of market access rules,
enhancement of the diversification of foreign exchange trading, introduction of an
OTC pricing system and a market-making system and improvement of the RMB ex-
change quotation.
Since 1949, the RMB exchange system has developed from managed rates to mar-
ket rates. On January 1, 1994, China began to implement a market-based, unique,
managed floating exchange rate system, the central bank set the floating range of
the RMB exchange rate, and kept the RMB exchange rate stable by regulating the
market. On July 21, 2005, the PBOC announced a managed floating exchange sys-
tem, which means that the RMB exchange rate is no longer pegged to the US dollar
but rather to a basket of currencies. RMB appreciated 2.1% against US dollar on
that day. On June 19, 2010, the PBOC further promoted reform of the exchange
rate, based on the market supply and demand, managing the RMB exchange rate
according to the exchange rate floating band.
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In the past 10 years, China’s strong economic growth, sustained trade surplus and
the continuous expansion of foreign exchange reserves (Figure 18) has generated
more and more pressure on the appreciation of RMB. Since July 2005, when the
reform of the RMB exchange rate began, the exchange rate of RMB to USD has ex-
perienced four stages (Figure 19). By the end of 2010, it had risen more than 20%.
In contrast, the exchange rate of RMB to the Euro and Yen became more volatile
(Figure 20).
■ Figure 18. China’s foreign exchange reserves, 1989-2009
Data source: WinD info
■ Figure 19. Four stages of RMB exchange rate after the exchange rate reform
Data source: the PeoPle’ bank of china
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■ Figure 20. The exchange rate of RMB against Euro and Yen
Data source: the PeoPle’ bank of china
In recent years, with the development of China’s foreign exchange rate reform, the RMB
exchange rate relied more on market supply and demand, and the elasticity of RMB in-
creased gradually (Figure 21). Since 2009, based on the forward RMB exchange rate,
the expectation of RMB appreciation has strengthened again (Figure 22).
■ Figure 21. The elasticity of RMB increased gradually
Data source: the PeoPle’ bank of china
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■ Figure 22. RMB forward exchange rate: 2005-2010
Data source: the PeoPle’ bank of china
Against a backdrop of an excess of foreign exchange reserves, the worldwide expectation
of RMB appreciation and other various factors, the pressure of RMB appreciation tends
to always exist. To maintain the stability of the RMB exchange rate, the PBOC intervened
in the foreign exchange market and wrote it off to avoid significant impacts in the do-
mestic money market. However, this strategy puts monetary policy into a dilemma: on
the one hand, with the appreciation of the RMB, the write-off cost for PBC becomes
higher and higher; on the other hand, because of the excess liquidity, the RMB might
be depreciated internally and thus generate large inflation pressure. Thus, the reform
of RMB becomes more urgent under this dilemma. The marketization of the foreign ex-
change rate will be the reform trend of the future.
F. Real Estate Market
Due to the huge market demand driven by high economic growth and urbanization,
a negative long-term real interest rate, and narrow investment channels, real estate
gradually become the main investment product in China. Housing and land prices
in China were rising rapidly because of strong consumer and investment demand.
According to the National Bureau of Statistics in China, since 2004, China’s aver-
age commercial housing sales price rose more than 10%, and land and residential
housing prices rose more than 10% a quarter for a long period of time. Since the
second half of 2009, with the announcement of a $4 trillion stimulus plan of the
Chinese government, the Chinese real estate market boomed again, and housing
prices in many areas rose more than 50% within six months.
The risk for the Chinese real estate market is continually increasing with the rise of
housing and land prices. For the housing price-to-income ratio, the word average
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level is 6 to 8; for London and Los Angeles, it was 9 to 12 at the peak time. How-
ever, even the second-tier cities in China are close to 10, first-tier cities such as Bei-
jing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou are close to or even above 20 (Figure 23). For the
housing price-to-rent ratio, China has reached approximately 400, far higher than
international standards, specifically, 200 to 300 higher. The value of total amount
of houses, construction projects and land reserves is three times the GDP, about
100 trillion RMB. The housing value-to-GDP ratio and rental income in Beijing and
Shanghai are similar than they were in Hong Kong in 1997. Besides, the number of
vacant houses is quite large, which is obviously caused by a large amount of spec-
ulation activities.
■ Figure 23. Housing Price-to-Income Ratios of Major Cities in China
Data source: nomura, Demofigureia, Pivot
Real estate credit in financial institutions has continued to expand with rising hous-
ing prices and demand. As of the end of 2009, real estate loans issued by major
domestic financial institutions had reached 2.52 trillion RMB, accounting for 6.3%
of the total loans. Individual housing loans have reached 4.41 trillion, up 46.4%
compared with the same period last year and 37% higher than at the beginning of
the year. New individual housing loans were 1.4 trillion throughout year 2009,
about five times what they were in 2008 and twice as much as in 2007.
According to the PBOC’s statistics in 2009 for 22 major cities’ individual housing loans,
most samplers’ housing price-to-income ratios exceeded 6, and monthly mortgage-to-
income ratios exceeded 30%, indicating that the risk of individual housing loans is in-
creasing. From the joint distribution of the two ratios, Beijing, Hangzhou, Guiyang,
Shanghai and Shenzhen have already reached a high-risk arena (Figure 24).
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■ Figure 24. Housing price-to-income ratio and monthly mortgage-to-income
ratio in 22 major cities
Data source：PeoPle’s bank of china, rePort on chinese real estate finance, 2009
With housing prices continuing to rise, the average loan duration of borrowers rose
sharply in 2008 and 2009 (Figure 25), 3.62 years longer than before. At the same
time, the percentage  of down payment from the borrower or his/her family mem-
bers has been decreasing since 2005 (only a small increase in 2007), about 17 per-
cent within four years (Figure 26).
■ Figure 25. The average loan duration of buyers (Unit: year)
Data source: PeoPle’s bank of china, rePort on chinese real estate finance, 2009
■ Figure 26. Proportion of down payment from the borrower or his/
her family members (%)
Data source: PeoPle’s bank of china, rePort on chinese real estate finance, 2009
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In China, the social psychology of “house prices never fall” is causing more and more
serious “real estate dependency,” which not only has led to excessive concentration
of resources in the real estate industry but has also inhibited the innovation of local
government and enterprises. In the past three years, almost all facts have tended to
show that the Chinese real estate industry is in a very dangerous position. The sky-
rocketing price in the first quarter of 2010 is similar to the historical characteristics
of the end of a housing bubble. It is hard to predict when the bubble will burst, but
in China’s current situation, if the housing bubble remains uninhibited, the probability
of an asset price collapse will increase. Because the real estate industry is closely re-
lated to the stability of the macroeconomy, since April 2010, the Chinese government
has been implementing a series of policies, including a credit crunch and tax adjust-
ments, to inhibit fast growing housing prices.
■ 4. Financial Policy and Supervision System
4.1.  The Framework of Financial Policy
China’s financial policy system mainly consists of eight departments, which are the
PBOC, the National Development and Reform Commission, the State-owned As-
sets Supervision and Administration Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the Min-
istry of Commerce, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), China
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and China Insurance Regulatory Com-
mission (CIRC). They participate in financial policy formulation under the leader-
ship of the state council. Among them, the PBOC is the central bank in China,
mainly responsible for the implementation of monetary policy and maintenance of
macro financial stability. CBRC, CSRC and CIRC, respectively, monitor the banking,
securities and insurance sectors. The Ministry of Finance and other departments
make the corresponding regulations in accordance with their responsibilities.
As noted, although the above eight departments are responsible for researching,
formulating and implementing financial policy in China, the authority to make key
decisions remains highly concentrated in the state council. For example, the inde-
pendence of the central bank is not strong in the process of formulating and im-
plementing monetary policy. For many key operations, such as the adjustments of
interest and the reserve fund, the PBOC only can make suggestions, which will
merely be promulgated and implemented after the approval of the state council.
4.2 The Formulation and Implementation of Monetary Policy
In 1984, the central bank system in China was formally established, and the mod-
ern monetary policy began to form after the PBOC began specializing in the exercise
of central bank functions. Since the 1990s, direct control in the formulation and
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implementation processes of monetary policy has gradually narrowed, while indi-
rect control has expanded. The ultimate goal of monetary policy was to “stabilize
currency and thereby promote economic development.” The intermediate target
of monetary policy and operational objectives shifted from loan size to money sup-
ply and base currency. The indirect control measures, such as deposit reserves, in-
terest rates, central bank loans, discount, and open market operations have
gradually been employed more frequently. Using various tools to manage the base
currency (operating goals), China has built an indirect control system. Its ultimate
goal is currency stability, and its intermediate target is the money supply. 
In recent years, the establishment and improvement of an intermediate target for
the monetary policy system has been an important indicator of reform of monetary
policy in China, mainly manifested in the following aspects. The commercial bank
credit limit was cancelled; China has established a monetary system with the inter-
mediate goal of the operating target as a monetary base and the resulted target as
monetary supply. China first publicized the money supply index in 1993 and took
money supply M1 and M2 (broad money supply) as a monetary policy control tar-
get in 1996, which marked the formal introduction of an intermediate target for
monetary policy. In 1998, the status of money supply as an intermediate target
was further consolidated with the cancellation of credit control (Figure 27).
■ Figure 27. Money supply growth in China: 2001-2009
Data sources: WinD infot
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From the practice of China’s monetary policy in recent years, the main task of mon-
etary policy is to ensure the target of dual stability in commodity prices and ex-
change rates in an environment of current and capital account surpluses. From the
perspective of operations, to resolve problems derived from continuous inflows of
foreign money, the PBOC mainly adopted the following method. It purchased for-
eign exchange constantly, following a certain exchange-rate policy framework;
Moreover, it used various monetary policy instruments to reduce excessive money
supply growth caused by the inflows of foreign money, keeping prices stable.
In terms of the targets of China’s monetary policy, price stability and economic
growth are dual-core targets. In terms of the actual effect of monetary policy for
promoting economic growth, China’s GDP remained at an average 10% growth over
recent years. Even during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, the Chinese econ-
omy still grew more than 9% (Figure 28). In terms of keeping prices stable, the in-
flation index based on the CPI and PPI were still controllable (Figure 29).
■ Figure 28. GDP growth rate and per capita GDP of China: 1978-2009
Data sources: china’s statistical Yearbook, china’s financial Yearbook, WinD info
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■ Figure 29. The CPI and PPI in China: 1999-2009>
Data sources: WinD info
4.3 Decision-making and Financial Supervision System
From the perspective of the financial supervision system in China, the Chinese finan-
cial industry currently executes a management system of “segregated operation and
segregated management.” In this system, securities companies are supervised by
CSRC, insurance companies are supervised by CIRC, banks are supervised by CSRC,
and the non-bank financial institutions other than securities companies and insurance
companies are supervised by the non-bank-financial-institution supervision depart-
ment in CBRC (figure 30).
■ Figure 30. The segregated supervision system of financial industry in China
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In recent years, China’s prudent banking supervision framework has gradually ma-
tured and complied with international standards. A series of prudent supervision
indexes, including capital level, capital quality, dynamic provision, liquidity risk, the
large amount of risk exposure and concentration risk, became the basic standards
in the bank risk management. Asset classification accuracy and provision standards
have been substantially enhanced, and the notion of avoiding bankruptcy, having
sufficient resources and a long-term commitment has become the important con-
sensus for offering shareholdership of financial institutions. Also, indicators such
as the loan-value ratio and debts-revenue ratio became important means to control
the credit risk in specific domains (such as real estate). In the process of coping
with the global financial crisis, the regulators in China carried out a simple, direct
and strict supervision measure, hence playing a positive role in effectively preventing
financial risks. The “fireproof construction” received positive attention from the
government, and the assessment and exiting mechanism has been advanced in a
test pilot for the mixed operations; also, deferment and deduction of compensation
made the risk exposure and incentive mechanisms more linked in terms of manage-
rial responsibility and tenor.
■ 5. The Political Economics of China’s Financial 
Development: Nationally Dominant Progressive Reform
Before the economic transition of China, the central bank had various banking func-
tions, but focused mainly on fiscal functions. In the central planning system, banks
were passive recipients of deposits, and the lack of financial instruments often made
deposits the only investment tool for residents. With the acceleration of market re-
form, a single banking system has gradually turned into a double-tiered system, in
which commercial banks are separated from the central bank, but the separation
never has a fundamental influence on the behavior of commercial banks. In terms
of banking reform in a transitional economy, banks, from birth to reform, are not
endogenous; they exist for the purpose of gathering savings for countries (See
Zhang, 1998). In fact, since the 1990s, China has remained at very high savings
rates (Figure 31), which is related not only to the special economic and social sys-
tem in China but also to the need for high savings in the country. For a long time,
the high savings rates and low real interest rates provided the main financial support
for the investment-driven economic growth in China. 
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■ Figure 31. The national saving rates of China and other countries
Note: All the data are ratios of domestic savings to GDP.
Data sources: Data of china are from the national bureau of statistics, the Pbc, Data of other
countries are from the imf Data.
With the acceleration of Chinese economic development and opening, the financial
system reforms were put on the agenda. These reforms were mainly observed at
two levels, the “stock” level and “increment” level. At the stock level, commercial
banks became independent business bodies through marketization reform, enhanc-
ing their self-development capabilities and international competitiveness. At the
increment level, the multi-level financial market system with the stock market at
the center was established; this gradually changed the previous monotonic financial
system. 
Undoubtedly, the development and reform of the Chinese financial system is a typ-
ical nationally dominant institutional transition process. On the one hand, the na-
tionally dominant banking system reform, which was under fiscal pressure,
emphasized the replacement of state-owned banks to the public finance and real-
ized the transformation to market-oriented operations without altering the state-
owned financial control rights. On the other hand, banking reform was progressive,
bearing small resistance and low costs. The focus of the reform was outside the
national banking system, i.e., to promote the development of other commercial
banks outside the original state-owned property rights structure. It follows that a
few financial intermediaries came into being that could negotiate with national
banks. To some extent, financial reform also promoted the development of en-
dogenous financial markets and institutions.
To understand the nationally dominant progressive financial reform in China, it is
very important to know that the country needs to control the macro financial riskth
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in the process of reform and opening. Considering the radical reforms and financial
liberalization in Latin America, East Asia and other developing countries, China
has persistently held a prudent view to financial opening and has endeavored to
avoid the problems that result from excessive financial liberalization. For strategic
decision-makers in China, the propulsion of economic reform must consider social
stability as the premise, and the financial reform’s advancement must consider eco-
nomic stability as the prerequisite. Following the guiding ideology of “stability
above all,” China accumulated massive national capital, and the high foreign ex-
change reserves would also be considered an important way to resist various ex-
ternal shocks . Retaining relatively high foreign exchange reserves is a significant
strategy to ensure macro financial stability in China. This affected China’s ability
to maintain financial stability during the special periods, such as the financial crisis,
not just for the need of international payments.
Overall, through constructing a double-tiered banking system of “central bank and
state-owned commercial banks” and promoting the gradual reform of the foreign
exchange administration system and financial opening, China finally formed a gov-
ernment-dominant financial structure, called “three carriages,” including three as-
pects. The first aspect is monetary policy, which needs to balance inflation control
and economic growth. The second aspect is bank credit expansion based on the
implicit guarantee of the country. The third aspect is an adjustable pegged RMB
exchange rate based on capital controls (Figure 32). For quite a long time, partic-
ularly in the process of China’s progressive transition, the above-mentioned gov-
ernment-dominant financial structure provided sufficient credit support for the
marketization of enterprises at the micro level, and effectively achieved the balance
between the economic growth and inflation at the macro level. However, in the
further development of financial marketization and financial opening in China, the
“three carriages” (the government dominant financial structure) also faced some
latent problems. 
The first problem is that monetary policy lacks independence, i.e., economic
growth often becomes the main target of monetary policy. Thus, excessive money
issuance and long-term negative real interest rates might lead to price bubbles and
hyperinflation in the future. The second problem is that the national implicit guar-
antee and state-owned bank-dominant credit expansion generally produced adverse
selection and moral hazard problems, thus the distortion of the incentive mecha-
nism may lead to low efficiency of enterprises performance. The third problem is
that the central bank’s monetary policy faced increasing difficulties in choosing
between price stability and exchange rate stability during the continuous influx of
foreign money. Therefore, the classical “ternary paradox” tends to be a prominent
problem in China’s future market opening process. 
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■ Figure 32. The government dominant financial structure and characteristics
■ 6. Conclusion
After the most recent global financial crisis, many scholars and social practitioners
began talking about the “China mode” of economic development. In the last 30 years,
Chinese economic growth has made three core achievements. The first achievement
is to successfully introduce a modern market economy system, and the vigor released
by changing the old system was the fundamental motive of economic growth over
the past 30 years in China. The second aspect is to take full advantage of the three
comparative advantages of resources, including labor, land and market, which helped
to accumulate important initial economic resources in China over the past 30 years.
The third aspect is to insist on a model of progressive reform, which made economic
reform incorporate constant innovations and corrections, reducing the overall risk of
reform to a great extent. It is fair to say that the 30 years of reform and opening is the
macro background for financial development in China.
China is a typical emerging-market country, thus there must be many tradeoffs be-
tween government intervention and market forces during the transition process from
a planned to a market economy. The experience from China shows that powerful gov-
ernment intervention can overcome the deficiency of the markets to some extent in
the early phase of economic development, mobilizing social resources through “gov-th
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ernment as an alternative.” Mandatory institutional changes help develop the frame-
work of a market economy system rapidly. This “strong government -- weak market”
combination demonstrated a certain comparative advantage during the early phase
of economic development in China. 
The economic system of “government as an alternative” inevitably resulted in the gov-
ernment dominant financial structure and institutions. During the several decades be-
fore financial reform in China, the country controlled all of the financial resources such
that the prerequisites for market competition did not exist. This high national financial
monopoly not only led to the low efficiency of bank operations and increased the risk
of financial system but also suppressed financialization and financial innovation. Since
the 1990s, particularly after the access to the WTO in 2002, along with the deepening
of economic system reform and acceleration of the financial reform and opening, the
quantity of financial institutions increased rapidly, and the monopoly position of state-
owned banks was gradually broken. Therefore, the financial market developed rapidly;
moreover, the multi-layered and diversified financial system was also formed gradually.
At present, the financial reform of China has achieved great progress, mainly manifested
in the following aspects. In terms of financial institution reform, four state-owned com-
mercial banks completed shareholding reform and successfully listed on different stock
exchanges, and the commercialized financial intermediary system has enjoyed a fairly
large capacity. In terms of financial market reform, as non-tradable share reform was
completed, the stock market institutions were improved, and the financing function
was further promoted. In terms of financial supervision, the segregated supervision sys-
tem, constituting the central bank and three regulatory commissions, was mainly es-
tablished. Also, the regulatory law and system gradually improved, consistent with the
international market. Moreover, the effectiveness of financial supervision was remark-
ably improved. After 20 years of reform, financial openness of China gradually strength-
ened, and the interest rate marketization also made a lot of progress. Most interest
rates have realized marketization except that there still exists the floor of loan interest
rates and the ceiling of deposit interest rates. 
Undoubtedly, the direction of financial marketization reform in China has been clearly
set, and the expansion of the financial industry has also become an irreversible long-
term trend. During the next phase of financial reform, the following aspects will be-
come key topics. The first aspect is to further improve the corporate governance
mechanism of financial institutions (especially state-owned commercial banks), im-
prove its abilities for business expansion and financial innovation, and steadily ad-
vance mixed operation. The second aspect is to strengthen the institutional
construction of financial markets (especially the stock market), reinforce information
disclosure, repress internal transactions and improve the efficiency of the market. The
third aspect is to integrate regulatory resources, improve supervision measures, com-
t
he c
hinese financial system
 at the D
aw
n o
f the 21st c
entury: a
n o
verview
. Yulu C
hen, Yong M
a and K
e Tang
39A E S T I M AT I O
  
bine the macro and micro prudent views and establish the overall financial stability
framework. The fourth aspect is to gradually advance interest rate liberalization, 
exchange rate marketization and capital account opening, based on a progressive 
approach as well as to improve the openness of financial system based on the macro-
economic stability. 
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